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#1
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"Ferindo Middleton" <fmiddleton (AT) verizon (DOT) net> writes: =20=20=20 This bug report involves more than one proposed bug. I work at a federal government agency. The information technology division at this agency refuses to allow the database version 8.0.4 on their network because of several security vulnerabilities they noticed when testing the software application. =20=20=20=20=20 They obviously haven't "tested" anything --- they are merely reading the CVE reports for old Postgres versions. All known CVE problems are resolved in 8.0.4. (If they were actually serious about security, they wouldn't be letting you run Windows 2000 inside their network, but I digress.) regards, tom lane =20=20=20 |
#2
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All known CVE problems are resolved in 8.0.4. |
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* Ferindo Middleton (fmiddleton (AT) verizon (DOT) net) wrote: CVE-2005-0245 Buffer overflow in gram.y for PostgreSQL 8.0.0 and earlier may allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large number of arguments to a refcursor function (gram.y), which leads to a heap-based buffer overflow, a different vulnerability than CVE-2005-0247. I think this was fixed in 8.0.2... CVE-2005-0244 PostgreSQL 8.0.0 and earlier allows local users to bypass the EXECUTE permission check for functions by using the CREATE AGGREGATE command. This appears to have been fixed in 8.0.1. CVE-2005-0227 PostgreSQL (pgsql) 7.4.x, 7.2.x, and other versions allows local users to load arbitrary shared libraries and execute code via the LOAD extension. The CVE says it only affected pre-8.0 releases and I'm inclined to believe it. CVE-2005-0246 The intagg contrib module for PostgreSQL 8.0.0 and earlier allows attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via crafted arrays. Contrib modules are only an issue if you install them. If you don't need them, don't install them. Don't know if this was fixed but honestly I expect it was, the Postgres folks don't just sit around on their hands when CVE's come out. CVE-2005-0247 Multiple buffer overflows in gram.y for PostgreSQL 8.0.1 and earlier may allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via (1) a large number of variables in a SQL statement being handled by the read_sql_construct function, (2) a large number of INTO variables in a SELECT statement being handled by the make_select_stmt function, (3) alarge number of arbitrary variables in a SELECT statement being handled by the make_select_stmt function, and (4) a large number of INTO variables in a FETCH statement being handled by the make_fetch_stmt function, a different set of vulnerabilities than CVE-2005-0245. Looks like this was fixed in 8.0.2.. CVE-2005-1409 PostgreSQL 7.3.x through 8.0.x gives public EXECUTE access to certain character conversion functions, which allows unprivileged users to call those functions with malicious values, with unknown impact, aka the "Character conversion vulnerability This appears to have been fixed in 8.0.3. CVE-2005-1410 - The tsearch2 module in PostgreSQL 7.4 through 8.0.x declares the (1) dex_init, (2) snb_en_init, (3) snb_ru_init, (4)spell_init, and (5) syn_init functions as "internal" even when they do not take an internal argument, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and possibly have other impacts via SQL commands that call other functions that accept internal arguments. This appears to have been fixed in 8.0.3. It looks like these were all fixed rather quickly after they were discovered and brought to the attention of the PostgreSQL team. http://www.gsa.gov/networx -> Networx Hosting Center -> NHC User Instructions, Executive Summary. No software is without bugs. It would be foolish to assume that you can deploy a system once and never have to update it for newly discovered security vulnerabilities. If you'd like a comparison to a product they may be allowing elsewhere you might consider looking at Oracle's track record for fixing security issues. It's rather... poor. There have been a number of articles to this affect on bugtraq recently, you shouldn't have too much trouble finding good examples. Enjoy, Stephen |
#3
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On Fri, 2005-11-18 at 09:32 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: All known CVE problems are resolved in 8.0.4. I was unaware of this. I've looked at the release notes and searched the archives, but this doesn't seem to be mentioned by CVE number. (The vulnerabilities and their resolutions are described, just without direct cross reference to their CVE number.) Do we have an on-project description of this? If we-as-a-project know this, it seems straightforward to write it down. It seems like we need a much clearer resource for security admins to check our compliance levels. This could be a source of similar refusal-to-implement PostgreSQL at other installations, so could almost be regarded as an advocacy issue. Other software projects have been criticized badly for their security response and info dissemination - I don't believe that applies here, but it does indicate the general requirement and its priority. i.e. don't just fix the bugs, tell everyone you've fixed the bugs. Or, at very least, put stronger security warnings onto the releases. (My own advice is always to watch for announcements and stay current). |
#4
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Simon Riggs wrote: On Fri, 2005-11-18 at 09:32 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: All known CVE problems are resolved in 8.0.4. It seems like we need a much clearer resource for security admins to check our compliance levels. This could be a source of similar refusal-to-implement PostgreSQL at other installations, so could almost be regarded as an advocacy issue. Other software projects have been criticized badly for their security response and info dissemination - I don't believe that applies here, but it does indicate the general requirement and its priority. i.e. don't just fix the bugs, tell everyone you've fixed the bugs. Well, as the original poster mentioned, they were looking for a reason _not_ to use PostgreSQL, and if that is the goal, you can find a reason, error numbers or not. |
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I am not excited about referencing error numbers from someone else. We know our errors better than anyone else, so I don't see the point. |
#5
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Unless somebody else wants to do this, I'll discuss on -www how we can get a page up on the .org site with this info on, so that we can be "CVE compatible". |
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