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#1
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#2
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Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? I had never heard of Fitch's paradox, but it sounds a like Gödel has |
#3
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Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? |
#4
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On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) -- Jan Hidders |
#5
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On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) |
#6
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On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) -- Jan Hidders |
#7
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On Dec 16, 11:09 pm, Jan Hidders <hidd... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) -- Jan Hidders "All truths are known" is only problematic if you assume that truth exists independent of cognition. From a phenomenalistic point of view, both entities and predicates exist purely in the mind, which means that all truths are known, but doesn't exclude the possibility of creating new truths based on sense data. I'm currently leaning in this direction (in the sense that Mach espoused), especially after coming across relational quantum mechanics. But I'm getting off-topic here. It seems to me now that Fitch's paradox just illustrates the distinction between OWA and CWA formally. |
#8
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Nilone wrote: On Dec 16, 11:09 pm, Jan Hidders <hidd... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) -- Jan Hidders "All truths are known" is only problematic if you assume that truth exists independent of cognition. *From a phenomenalistic point of view, both entities and predicates exist purely in the mind, which means that all truths are known, but doesn't exclude the possibility of creating new truths based on sense data. *I'm currently leaning in this direction (in the sense that Mach espoused), especially after coming across relational quantum mechanics. But I'm getting off-topic here. *It seems to me now that Fitch's paradox just illustrates the distinction between OWA and CWA formally. To be more clear/blunt, in the context of the RM, D&D have it that it is a value of the relation that has no attributes. *This may seem obscure in general language, but in the db machine context it is much simpler/clearer than the above. |
#9
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On Dec 16, 11:09*pm, Jan Hidders <hidd... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) "All truths are known" is only problematic if you assume that truth exists independent of cognition. |
#10
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On 17 dec, 03:56, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: On Dec 16, 11:09*pm, Jan Hidders <hidd... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: On 16 dec, 12:07, Nilone <rea... (AT) gmail (DOT) com> wrote: Does Fitch's paradox prove an inherent contradiction in the open-world assumption? Only if you assume that the database contains everything that is known. It rarely does. :-) Besides, do you really believe that everything that is true can be known? ;-) "All truths are known" is only problematic if you assume that truth exists independent of cognition. Which in my world view it is. It's positively weird to say that Fermat's last theorem was not true until a proof was found. If you want to do so, be my guest, but I'd argue you would be using another definition of truth than I am. -- Jan Hidders |
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